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WHO'S BLACK, WHO'S BROWN, AND WHO CARES?: 
A LEGAL DISCUSSION OF HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to be tried by a jury of one's peers IS 
considered fundamental in America. However, the 
classifications of individuals that compose a jury of one's 
peers, or even the pool from which such a jury is selected, 
have not always been as clearly defined. On June 18, 1952, 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the appeal of 
Pete Hernandez, a Mexican American 1 convicted by an all-
Anglo jury panel in Jackson County. 2 This county, despite 
its high concentration of Mexican Americans, had not 
allowed Mexican Americans to serve on a jury panel in more 
than twenty-five years. :3 League of United Latin American 
Citizens ("LULAC") attorneys Gus Garcia4 and John 
Herrera took Hernandez's case to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
using it to attack the systematic exclusion of Mexican 
Americans from Jury service in Texas. 5 The case made 
- -- --- --------
·This paper was prepared for the Latino/a Critical Legal Studies XI 2006 annual 
conference in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
1. Although I use the term Mexican American predominantly throughout this 
paper. I also use the term Latino interchangeably. 
2. Hernandc,z v. State (Hernandez I), 251 S.W.2d 5:H, 5:32 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1 952). reu'd sub 110111. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1 954). 
3. Hernandez, :147 U.S. at 480--81; see also Ian F. Haney Lopez. Race, 
Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143, 
1171 (1997) (stating that "by 1952, persons challenging the exclusion of Mexican 
Americans from juries could point, as Hernandez's lawyers did, to research 
indicating that in at least fifty Texas counties with large Mexican-American 
populations, no Mexican American had ever been called for jury service"). The 
point stipulated to in Hernandez was that many Mexican Americans qualified 
for jury· service. /d. 
4. See Renerally Lupe S. Salinas, Gus Garcia and ThurRood Marshall: Two 
[>ega! Giants FiRhting for .Justice 28 T. MA!lSHALL L. HEV. 145 (200:3) 
(overviewing LULAC's legal defense team): Gustavo C. Garcia, An Informal 
Report to the People, In A COTTON PICKEn FI:--JDS JUSTICE': THE So\GA OF THE 
HER:--JA?\DEZ C,\SE (Hulll'n Munguia eel., 1954). 
CJ. Haney Lopez. supra notE~ 3, at 1144-·45. 
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history when the Court ruled that systematic jury exclusion 
of a discriminated social class is unconstitutional. 6 In so 
ruling, the Court abandoned the notion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only protected African Americans. 7 This result 
continues to have a significant impact in today's jurisprudence 
because it set precedent allowing for an expansive 
interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment protections beyond 
that of race. 
This comment begins with an overview of the facts and 
issues in Hernandez at the appellate and Supreme Court 
level, and then analyzes the three ways in which Hernandez 
helped Mexican Americans and other minority groups. 
Hernandez v. Texas ("Hernandez") helped Mexican 
Americans and other minority groups8 by (1) rejecting the 
established "two-class" social theory by extending 
Fourteenth Amendment privileges to other groups besides 
African Americans; 9· 10 (2) establishing precedent to 
eliminate exclusion of social classes in jury venires; and (3) 
aiding in the desegregation of schools at a national level. 11 
Although many scholars debate whether Hernandez went 
far enough m expanding the rights of Mexican Americans, 
()_ N<·il Foley, Discours<' at the University of Houston Law Center Conference on 
"HNnandcz u. Texas at 50'': Over The Rainbow: Hernandez u. Texas. !lrown P. Board of 
Education, and Black v. Brown (November 19, 2004). 
7. Haney Lopez, supra note :3, at 114fi. For an overview of Mexican 
American civil ri~hts litigation, see Geor~e A. Martinez, Lef{al Indeterminacy, 
.Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Liti{{ation Experience: 1930-1980, 
27 U.C. DAVlS L. REV. fififi (19~J4). 
H. This papPr discusses the extension of Fourteenth Amendment protections to 
Mexican Americans and othPr minority groups, meaning, other non-Black minorit:; 
~roups. In addition. Hernandez helped all Latino races and not simply l'vlexican 
AmPricans. However. since Hernandez deals with Mexican Americans and not all 
Latino groups, in this paper I will simply refpr to those protected as Mexican 
Americans. 
9. I use the terms Black Americans, African Americans, and Blacks 
interchangPably. I know that many rPcent African immigrants resent tlw widt>spread 
use of' the term Af1·ican American. Conversely. many African Americans resent the 
!Prms black and Black American used to characterize them. 
10. This "two classes" tlwory rr;su]tpd from the treatment of the courts 
lwfore Hernandez. which had recognized only white and black discrimination as 
an 1ssue. 
11. Although Mendez 1'. Westminster, 64 F.Supp. 544 (C.D. Cal. HHfi). aff'd, 161 
F.2d 774 (Hth Cir. EJ41), famously desegre~ated schools in California. Hernandez 
in!luencPd Keyes :•. School /)istri!'t No. I, 41 :l U.S. 189 (197:3). which ultimatdy aided 
in integrating An~lo, African Arm•rican. and Mcxican American students. 
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this case was vital in helping Mexican Americans become 
included in Fourteenth Amendment discussions. 
II. HERNANDEZ V. STATE: 
THE STRUGGLE IN TEXAS STATE COURTS 
Pete Hernandez was convicted of first-degree murder in 
the Texas trial court and sentenced to life imprisonment. 12 
On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Pete 
Hernandez claimed that in spite of the fact that Mexican 
Americans were legally considered white, he suffered race-
based discrimination during his indictment. As the 
Supreme Court ultimately held, members of Mexican 
ethnicity were "deliberately, systematically, and wilfully 
[sic] excluded from the grand jury that found and returned 
the indictment in ... [his] case .... "13 In the trial court, a 
jury panel selected an all-Anglo jury to determine probable 
cause in his indictment. 14 Because Mexican Americans had 
been excluded from jury duty in Texas for at least twenty-
five years, Pete Hernandez' legal team sought to reverse the 
indictment and petit jury panel, "claiming he had ... been 
deprived of equal protection."15 They argued that the state 
deprived him of his constitutional right to judgment by a 
jury of his peers.l6 
Hernandez had not been the only Mexican American in 
Jackson County to be denied the right to a jury of his peers. 
In fact, not only were there no Mexican Americans on the 
jury for Hernandez's indictment, but no Mexican Americans 
had been called for jury service in the entire county for 
twenty-five years. 17 This exclusion had existed even though 
12. Hernandez v. State (Hernandez[), 251 S.W.2d 5:H, 5:l2 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1852). rev 'd sub nom. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Hernandez, 34 7 
U.S. at 47G. 
l:l. Hernandez I, 251 S.W.2d at Fi:l2. 
11. See id. "All-Anglo" meaning Caucasians. Although MPxican Americans wert' 
considered white. they were exclucle'cl from the jury. 
1:). ld. at s:>2. 
Hi. See id. 
17. Hernandez. :14 7 U.S. at 41-lO 81. The parties stipulated that no one with a 
1\ltexican-American surname had servPd on thP jury for twenty-five years. While it is 
tntt' that thne may have been Mexican Americans with Anglo surnames invited to 
S('rne on a jury panel, there is no evidence to this effect. 
354 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
there were Mexican Americans in Jackson County who 
"possessed the qualifications requisite to service as grand or 
petit jurors." 18 Even more, this system of discrimination 
was consistent in almost every county in the entire state of 
Texas. As Ian F. Haney Lopez explains, "By 1952, persons 
challenging the exclusion of Mexican Americans from juries 
could point, as Hernandez's lawyers did, to research 
indicating that in at least fifty Texas counties with large 
Mexican American populations, no Mexican American had 
ever been called for jury service." 19 
Despite the obvious exclusion of eligible Mexican 
Americans from jury service, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
upheld the lower court's determination that Jackson 
County's jury selection process was constitutional. 20 Since 
the law considered Mexican Americans "white people of 
Spanish descent,"21 there was no legally recognized racial 
difference between whites and Mexican Americans, and at 
that time, preference on the basis of national origin was not 
considered in juror selection. As Judge Davidson wrote m 
his opinion: 
In the absence of a holding by the Supreme Court of the 
United States that nationality and race bear the same 
relation, within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision (Fourteenth Amendment) mentioned, we shall 
continue to hold that the statute law of this State 
furnishes the guide for the selection of juries in the State, 
and that, in the absence of proof showing express 
discrimination by administrators of the law, a jury so 
selected in accordance therewith is valid. 22 
In other words, while discrimination based upon legally 
recognized races was prohibited, nationality-based 
discrimination within a legal classification during jury 
selection was permissible so far as the Court of Criminal 
Appeals was concerned until a statement from the U.S. 
~------~---
lS. Hernandez I, 251 S.W.2d at 5:i:1. 
10. Haney Lopez, supra note 3. 
20. Hernandez I, 251 S.W.2d at 533. 
21. Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1%1). 
22. Hernandez I, 251 S.W.2d. at 53:3 (quoting Sanchez v. State. 1Sl S.W.:Zd 
87, 90-Hl (Tex. Crim. App. 1044)). 
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Supreme Court mandated otherwise.23 
Pete Hernandez and his legal team appealed to higher 
courts. They first tried to file a motion to quash the 
indictment and petit jury panel. 24 The appellate court 
denied that appeal four months later on October 22, 1952. 20 
The legal team then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which granted a writ of certiorari on October 12, 1953.26 
III. HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS: 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S BREAKTHROUGH HOLDING 
Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren reversed Judge 
Davidson's decision from the Texas Appellate Court. 27 In 
doing so, the Warren Court noted, "The Fourteenth 
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination 
due to a 'two-class theory'-that is, based upon differences 
between 'white' and Negro." 28 Thus, even though the law 
considered Mexican Americans white, they could still seek 
legal recourse under the Fourteenth Amendment for 
discrimination. 29 In order to find legal recourse, however, 
the petitioner had to prove that the individuals seeking 
protection were discriminated against as a group despite 
their legal uniformity with whites. 30 Once the petitioner 
established a prima facie case of discrimination against 
individuals within that group, the State of Texas had to 
rebut by showing that discrimination did not exist. :n 
As the petitioner, Pete Hernandez and the other 
members of his LULAC legal team were faced with the 
initial burden of showing group discrimination in selection 
of the jury panel in Jackson County. 32 This initial showing 
was accomplished in two steps. First, the LULAC attorneys 
- -------- --------
2:-l. Sec id. 
24. !d. at r;:-n. 
25. !d. at 531, r;:i6. 
26. Hernandez v. Texas, 74 S.Ct. 52 (19!1:i). 
27. Hernandl'z v. Texas (Hernandez), 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
28. !d. at 478. 
29. !d. at 4 77 78. 
:10. Sec id. at 479-81. 
:n. !d. at 479, 481. 
:i2. ld. at 480. 
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established that persons of Mexican descent constituted a 
separate class in Jackson County by showing the attitude of 
the community.:33 They provided testimony of "responsible 
officials and citizens" that residents distinguished between 
white and Mexican in many areas of life, including the 
exclusion of Mexicans from business and community 
groups, grade schools, local restaurants, and even 
washroom facilities. 34 Second, having established that 
Mexican Americans constituted a separate class, the 
LULAC attorneys showed discrimination against that class 
by supplying proof that the Jackson County jury 
comm1sswners had systematically excluded Mexican 
Americans from jury pools for twenty-five years. :lii The 
State of Texas failed to provide substantial rebuttal to 
Hernandez's asserted claims. 36 Because of this failure, the 
Court "concluded that [Hernandez had] succeeded in his 
proof':37 and, therefore, had met his burden of establishing 
nationality-based discrimination that impermissibly 
influenced jury selection. :is 
While Jackson County's process of jury selection was not 
explicitly discriminatory, Warren concluded that the Texas 
system of juror selection was "susceptible to abuse.":i!-l The 
system the county employed consisted of the commissioners 
going through rosters of names to pick out available 
jurors. 40 This process allowed for discrimination based upon 
Spanish-sounding surnames. 41 Warren acknowledged that 
the selection process the commissioners used was "fair on 
its face[,]" but "[could] be employed in a discriminatory 
:1:1. Id. at 479-80. 
:3·1. 1 think it is worth noting that 1954 is the same year that a full~hlown 
repatriation effort of thl' Braceros was taking placP in the United States. It 
should be argued that this should evoke some kind of national test as oppos,•d to 
a community~based test for prejudicial feelings towards the Mexican Americans. 
See .JUAN RAMON GARCIA, Oi'EHNI'ION WETBA<'K: THE MASS DI•:PORTATI0:-.1 OF 
l\1J.;XJ('AN UNIJOCUI'viE:-.JTED W(mKEKS IN 1954 (l9HO). 
:Jii. Hernnndcz, 347 U.S. at 479-80. 
:w. !d. at 481. 
:n. Id. at 41-\0. 
:JH. !d. at ·+80-81. 
3>J. Id. at ·179. 
40. !d. at 4 76 n.l. 
41. !d. at 4HO n.12. 
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manner ... [,] and discrimination fis] prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."·12 Warren concluded that Pete 
Hernandez was constitutionally entitled "to be indicted and 
tried by juries from which all members of his class [were] 
not systematically [excluded] .... "4 :1 Warren later noted 
that all qualified persons should be considered for jury 
panels regardless of race and that race-based 
discrimination for jury service violated the Constitution. 44 
The Warren Court's acknowledgement of race-based 
discrimination outside of the black-white context in the 
Hernandez decision is of particular significance today 
because its impact extended beyond that of jury selection 
and into the basic tenets of Fourteenth Amendment 
protections. Before the Hernandez ruling, many entities, 
including counsel for the State of Texas, had traditionally 
thought that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to 
African Americans, and not to other minority groups. 45 The 
Hernandez opm10n established that the Fourteenth 
Amendment should protect every social class created by a 
community attitude that subjects the class to unfair laws 
and discriminatory practices. 46 By recognizing that a 
community could create a social class-and that Mexican 
Americans, although traditionally classified as white, 
constituted such a class-the Court established a precedent 
that groups besides African Americans could receive 
Fourteenth Amendment protections. 47 
IV. DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF HERNANDEZ 
Legal and social scholars disagree over whether or not 
Hernandez helped or hurt Mexican Americans. The review 
and analysis of the divergent views will be broken up into 
two sections. Section A, discusses criticisms pointed out by 
commentators of Hernandez who feel that the opmwn may 
42. I d. at 4 7!-J. 
48. Jd. at 4H2. 
-±4. K\HL W,\IUll<::\, TilE MEIIIOII{S OF EAI(L WAIWEf.; 2!-JH (l)oublceday 2001) 
(I 'J77). 
45. Sec Hcrnnndez. 847 U.S. at 477. 
46. Jd. 
47. ld. 
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prove to be a disadvantage for Mexican Americans in a legal 
context because the Court failed to recognize Mexican 
Americans as a protected class based upon national origin 
and only distinguished them from whites when local actions 
were discriminatory. Section B discusses the opinions and 
viewpoints of the proponents of Hernandez. The supporters 
of Hernandez argue that the Hernandez opinion set the 
stage for future decisions like Cisneros u. Corpus Christi 48 
and other desegregation cases to establish rights for 
Mexican Americans. 
A. Skeptical Viewpoints of Hernandez 
Skeptics of the Hernandez decision feel that by using a 
community-based standard rather than a race-based 
standard to extend Fourteenth Amendment protections, 
many classes that should find legal protection are left 
unrecognized by the courts. They decry Hernandez, citing 
that the decision only extended Fourteenth Amendment 
privileges to Mexican Americans if certain local community 
criteria were established. As Haney Lopez argues, this 
"implicitly [rejects] a conceptualization of Mexican 
Americans as a group defined in racial terms." 49 In terms 
that responded to the LULAC strategy of proving 
community-based discrimination, the Court failed to state 
outright in Hernandez that classification as Latino or 
Mexican American could be a distinct racial classification 
and subject to Fourteenth Amendment protections. 
Instead, the Court found discrimination on the basis of 
Spanish surnames. The Hernandez opinion determined that 
"Spanish names provide ready identification"50 of members 
of the Mexican American class in that county. This claim, 
notes one author, is misleading because of the many 
"[i]ndividuals who adopt a new last name upon 
marriage ... [and] whose ethnicity may not be determined 
by surname."51 In addition, many Spanish last names are 
48. 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972). 
49. Haney Lopez, supra note :3, at 1151. 
50. Hernandez, :l47 U.S. at 481 n.12. 
51. Lisette E. Simon, Hispanics: Not a Cognizable t•:thnic Group, o:l U. CIN. 
L. REV. 497, 514 (Fall, 1994). The author notes, "NeithL•r the lc>gislatures nor the 
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indistinguishable from Italian last names, and "many 
natives of Central and South America do not have 
traditionally Spanish last names."52 However, because the 
standard is a community-based discrimination standard, 
many of these individuals still suffer from the 
discrimination in their local communities because of their 
race, and yet do not receive Fourteenth Amendment 
protection because they are not legally distinguishable as a 
protected class. 
One possible reason that the opmwn failed to 
distinguish Mexican Americans as a separate and protected 
race is that the Supreme Court Justices, like many others 
in the period, may have been racially biased against 
Mexican Americans. 58 Legal historian Mark Tushnet argues 
that Justice Clark, one of the Justices present on the Court 
during Hernandez, was opposed to overturning Plessy and 
eliminating segregation in the South as late as 1952. 
Furthermore, Tushnet documents that Justice Clark spoke 
of Texas having "'the Mexican problem' which was 'more 
serious' because the Mexicans were 'more retarded' [than 
their peers], and mentioned the problem of a 'Mexican boy 
of 15 ... in a class with a negro girl of 12."'54 Tushnet 
argues that Justice Clark's bias seems to be a factor that 
may have played a role in the outcome of the case. 55 
However, inherent prejudice against Mexican Americans by 
----~-----
courts. however. have been able to define consistently or accurately the term 
'Hispanic."' !d. at 506-07. 
52. ld. at 514. Simon notes that since the 1930 census, Mexican Amerieans 
were known as a separate racial class. !d. at 507. This occurred until 1980 when 
the n·nsus bureau became aware of how inaccurate the surname classification 
really was. !d. at Gl:l-14. 
fi:l. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: TilE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE l:oH<l9 (HHJ6). Haney Lopez argues that many times prosecutors and 
judges unconsciously let biases creep into sentencing and prosecuting. 
fi.J. MAJ{K V. TUSIINET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THUJ{C:OOD MAJ{SH . .\LL 
AND Till•: SUPREME COURT, 19:Hi-1961, at 194 (199:1). In light of the evid(:nce, it 
seems ironic that Thurgood Marshall was chosen to replace Clark on the bench 
in 1967. The usP of "retarded" at the time referred to slower progress through tlw 
school s:v·stem. not mental retardation. One who was held back was "retard("d." See 
DAVIIl B. TYACK. THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN UlmAN EDUCi\'1'1001 
199 (Hl74). At the same time, there was use of IQ testing to place minority students 
into service-oriented tracks without respect to language or cultural barriers. !d. at 212. 
fi:). !d. 
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the justices, which may have led to a community-based 
standard rather than a race-based standard, is not the only 
reason that the Hernandez decision receives criticism. 
Another reason that the Supreme Court may not have 
classified Mexican Americans as a protected racial class is 
because the LULAC lawyers specifically avoided reclassifying 
Mexican Americans as "non-white." In essence, they told the 
Supreme Court they wanted protection without race 
reclassification. The Supreme Court gave them, more or less, 
what they requested. 
Some civil rights organizations have argued that 
Hernandez u. Texas was debilitating to Mexican Americans 
because it did not go far enough. James A. Ferg Cadima, 
legislative staff attorney for the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), argues that 
Hernandez stood in the way of equal protection because it 
classified Mexican Americans as white and deprived them 
of the benefits that Hernandez's companion case, Brown v. 
Board of Education,:16 provided for blacks.:>7 Thomas Saenz, 
a MALDEF litigator, argues that "[i]n Hernandez, the Court 
squarely faced an argument that discrimination based on 
ethnicity is legally distinct from race discrimination."fiil 
Saenz argues that the outcome of Hernandez failed to 
establish anti-Mexican discrimination as proscribed racial 
discrimination. Thus, as the precedent-setting Mexican 
American civil rights ease, many skeptics are frustrated 
that Hernandez did not do more. 
Finally, Richard Delgado argues that the Hernandez 
opinion came about solely because Anglo-Americans desire 
to give Mexican Americans a sense of false empowerment.G0 
Delgado argues, much like Mary Dudziak and Derrick Bell, 
that Mexican American Civil Rights had less to do with 
5(i. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., :l,l7 U.S. 4il3 (19Fi4). 
67 .• JA,IES A. FEHC:-CAJJ!Mi\, MEXICAN AM. LEC:AL DEJI. & EDlW. FUNIJ. 
BL.\Ch. \VIIJTE A:---lll BilOW:\: L.\'1'1:---10 SCHOOL DESEC:l\E(:Xl'lO:--J EFFOHT:-; 1:\ Till·: 
PIU> A;..!D POST- BIWWN V. BOAIW OF EDLICA'I'ION ERA 2::3-24 (2004), auailahlc of 
http://www. maldef.org/puhlications/pdl/La ti noDPsegraga tion l'apPr200-l. pdf. 
5K. Thomas A. S;wnz. Mendez and the Legacy of Brown: A Latino Cir·il 
Rights Lawyer's Assessment. 11 ASIAN L .• J. 27fi, 2HO (2004). 
69. Richard DL·Igado, Rodrigo's Roundelay: Hernandez v. TPxas ond the lntcrest-
Conucrf.!ence Dilemma, 41 I-IAHV. C.lt-C.L.L. HEV. 2>l (200fi). 
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Mexican American actions and more to do with the actions 
of Anglo-Americans who gave groups civil rights simply to 
fulfill their own selfish interests. 60 Delgado may, however, 
go too far as his argument develops from the fact that the 
self-interest merely influences the decision to a near 
dictation of how civil rights issues are resolved. While this 
viewpoint should be considered carefully, it is difficult to 
accept the core of Delgado's argument-that civil rights 
activists had no impact on the granting of civil rights in 
America and any gains made were merely a product of the 
majority interests converging with minority rights. 
B. Optimistic Viewpoints of Hernandez 
Despite the frustration of many Mexican American 
advocates, not all observers of the Hernandez decision feel 
that the protections afforded by the decision are 
inadequate. Justice Earl Warren argued that the 
protections of Hernandez were consistent with the Brown 
decision. 61 Warren explained that the "segregation case 
decisions went hand-in-hand with the principle of Brown v. 
Board of Education. Those decisions related not only to 
blacks but equally to all racial groups that were 
discriminated against."62 Regarding Hernandez, a case 
argued two weeks before Brown, Warren explained: 
The state contended that . . . discrimination did not 
violate the Constitution because the Fourteenth 
Amendment bore only on the relationship between blacks 
and whites. We hold that it applied to "any delineated 
class'' and reversed the conviction. And so it must go with 
any such cases. They apply to any class that is singled out 
for discrimination. Most of our cases have involved blacks, 
but that is because . . . [they] have been the most 
discriminated against. 6;3 
Thus, according to Warren, the Court tried to extend 
application of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to all minority groups. 64 
60. ld. at :w- :11. 
61. W\llHE:"<. supra note 44. at 299. 
62. lei. 
6:). lei. 
64. Wal't'en wrott· such favorable words in his memoirs because he may have 
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Legal scholars who agree with Warren share the belief 
that Hernandez extended Fourteenth Amendment rights 
beyond African Americans. One such scholar, Kevin 
Johnson, argues that "Brown, when read in combination 
with Yick Wo, 65 Carolene Products, 66 and Korematsu,"m 
clearly extend the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment beyond African Americans. 68 He continues, "It 
was not much of a leap to hold that Mexican Americans 
deserved the same constitutional protections as other racial 
minorities, which was the precise question posed by 
Hernandez v. Texas." 69 However, while there rs 
disagreement amongst legal scholars as to how far the 
racial protections of the Hernandez decision extend, some 
feel that the decision is based upon entirely different 
principles. 
V. THE HERNANDEZ COURT AND COLORBLINDNESS 
Perhaps the Court's reasoning in Hernandez is 
colorblind as it does not even address the issue of Mexican 
American's racial classification. 70 While Hernandez 
challenged a discriminatory process of jury selection eerily 
similar to the Jim Crow laws of the South, the Court 
undPrstood that Brown would become a very high profile case with far·rPaching 
ramifications. Tht> media glorified and deified Earl Warren and his court--in 
spitt> of Warren's less-than-stellar civil rights record as Governor of California. 
Warren may have altered his memoirs according to how he would have liked to 
perceive the truth. which may have !wen that since African Americans had been 
tlw most discriminated against, the 13rown opinion truly did only protPct thPm 
and no other minority group. 
G5. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, llH U.S. :~56 (JHHG) (holding that the 
discriminatory enforcement of a local ordinance against persons of Chinese· 
ancl·stry violated the Equal Protection Clausp of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
GG. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., :304 U.S. 144 (19:lH) (using general 
language to describe groups protected by the Equal Protection Clause). 
G7. Korematsu v. United States, :~23 U.S. 214 (1944) (dt>claring that whill' 
the FourtPcnth Amendment protects persons of a single racial group. military 
necl•ssity justified the .Japam•se internment camps). 
fi8. Kevin .Johnson. Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of ,Justice and Injustice. 
2:0 C!IICANO-LATINO L. REV. J5:l, 171 (2005). 
69. Id. 
70. For a further discussion of this idea sl'e Ian F. Hanl'y Lopez. Race and 
Colorblindness After Hernandez and Brown, 25 CIIICANO-LATI:-.10 L. l{EV. (il 
(2005). 
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recognized that traditionally Fourteenth Amendment 
protections had been only extended to those of color. 71 The 
Court further noted that the Hernandez case stemmed from 
jury exclusion of a clas·s based on "grounds other than race 
or color."72 Significantly, the Court recognized that because 
Mexican Americans were legally classified as white, the 
Fourteenth Amendment protections should be extended to 
people whose class is distinguished by other means. 73 
Indeed, the Hernandez decision arguably bases 
Fourteenth Amendment protection on a standard 
disconnected from race altogether. Notably, the LULAC 
team emphasized this when they propounded the notion 
that their experience was similar to that of other white 
groups who had been historically discriminated against. 74 
Gus Garcia, the LULAC attorney representing Pete 
Hernandez, wrote: 
We are not passing through anything different from that 
endured at one time or another by other unassimilated 
population groups: the Irish in Boston (damned micks, they 
were derisively called); the Polish in the Detroit area (their 
designation was bohunks and polackers); the Italians in New 
York (referred to as stinking little wops, dagoes and guineas); 
the Germans in many sections of the country (call dumb 
square-heads and krauts); and our much maligned friends of 
the Jewish faith, who have been persecuted even here, in the 
71. See Hernand<>z v. Texas (Hernandez). :347 U.S. 4/G. ·~IK (1954). 
7'.!.. See id. at 477. 
7:\. ld. at 479-RO. 
74. Evidences of this notion stem from the fact that the preferred title was 
person of Latin desctmt," "Hispanic (meaning of Spanish origin)." and other 
names for Latinos hesidl's "Mexican," or "Mexican American." It can hl' argm•d 
that even their advocacy groups (The Anwrican GI Forum. League of UnitPd 
Latin 1\merican Citizens) never used the word "Mexican." "Brown." "colorPd." or 
any othl'r non-white language. Currently, names for Latinos consist of Mexican 
Anwricans, Mex-Americans. Chicanos, La Raza, Mexicanos, and Xicanos. The 
main advocacy groups have names like the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund. La Raza Unida, and other such names. See IGNACIO \L\i{CIA. 
C!IH'.\:\IS:VIO: THE FOil<:!:--!() OF A MILITANT ETHOS Al\WN(; MEXICAN Al\li<:Hil'.\NS 
(1997): see u/so HENilY A..J. RAMOS, THE Al\IEI{!C'A:--1 GI FOIWI\1: T:--1 Pum:uJT OF TilE 
DIH:.\~1. 1 ~l-18-1983 (19~JK): ARMA:--!DO NAVAIWO, THE CH!S'L\L EXPERII\IE:--!T: A 
Crlll',\:\0 STRUGGLE FOH COMMUNITY CONTIWL (199K); ](;NACIO GARC:L\. V!V,\ 
KEN:--!EIJY: MEXICAN AMEIUC'ANS IN Sio:Af(CH OF CAMELOT (2000); ARI'vi.\NIJO 
NAVAHIW. M~;XJCAN AMERICAN YOUTII O!WANIZATION: AVANT-GARDE OF TilE 
CHIC,\NO MOVEMENT IN TEXAS (1995). 
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land of the free, because to the bigoted they were just 'lousy 
kikes.' 75 
Garcia never drew a parallel to the Chinese, Middle 
Easterners, or any other group that has been considered 
racially distinct; rather, he drew parallels to Italians, Jews, 
Poles, and the Irish, groups who were considered to be 
white Americans. This exclusive use of other groups legally 
classified as white provides support for the assertion that 
the Hernandez decision was not founded m racial 
differences. 
Despite the possibility that Hernandez was based upon 
principles outside of the racial context, and although both 
the LULAC attorneys and the Court insisted that Mexican 
Americans were white, Hernandez ironically became the 
first of many cases that eventually dismantled the southern 
,Jim Crow laws. 76 The decision was able to do this because it 
provided a legal foundation that recognized that 
discrimination ultimately boils down to the local practices 
within the community and not to legally recognized 
classifications. 77 The Warren Court struck down the notion 
that there are only two racial classes. 78 Notably, when 
considering Fourteenth Amendment protections, the Court 
cited social norms that existed in Jackson County, Texas, at 
the time of the Hernandez sentencing instead of using skin 
color as an example. 79 It was this language that leads 
Haney Lopez to feel that the Hernandez decision is actually 
colorblind. 
This colorblind principle for the decision is supported by 
closer examination of the LULAC lawyer's strategy. LULAC 
lawyers provided the Court with evidence that documented 
the social phenomena that existed within Jackson County 
to demonstrate that an inferior sub-classification existed 
within the broader white classification of Anglos and 
7FJ. Gustavo C. Garcia, An Informal Report to the People. in A COTTON 
I'ICKER Fl:-.IDS .JUSTICE': THE SAGA OF THE HER:-.JA:-.IDEZ CASE (Ruben l\lunguia Pd .. 
19FJ4). 
7fi. Haney Lopez, supra note 70, at fi:i. 
II. !d. at HI. 
78. Hernandez, :347 U.S. at 478. 
79. !d. at 4 79-80. 
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Mexican Americans.so The Court found that "testimony of 
responsible officials and citizens contained the admission 
that residents of the community distinguished between 
'white' and 'Mexican."'81 The Court noted that the county 
required Mexican children to attend a segregated school for 
the first four grades in classrooms filled to twice the 
capacity of the Anglo schools.s2 Many local restaurants 
refused service to Mexican Americans. s:i The courthouse 
where the Hernandez case was tried even had segregated 
bathrooms for Mexican Americans and Anglm;.s4 
Furthermore, the Court found that "[n]o substantial 
evidence was offered to rebut the logical inference [of 
discrimination] to he drawn from these facts .... "85 The 
Court determined that, in light of the evidence of inferior 
treatment towards Mexican Americans, a social class had 
developed. 86 Thus, despite the historical legal distinction 
based upon color, the Court determined that a social class 
was distinct for purposes of protection against 
discrimination. This colorblind approach helped extend 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection to people of all 
social classes-especially in the context of jury selection. 
VI. GETTING PAST BLACK AND WHITE: 
THE ROLE OF HERNAN!JEZ lN REDEFINING 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The legal precedent before Hernandez supported the 
''two-class" social theory of race, which recognized African 
Americans as the only group protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 87 This constitutional history of Hernandez has 
80. /d. >It 4 79. 
81. !d. 
8:2. !d. The Court also noted that most of the childrl'n of Mexican descc·nt 
left school by the fifth or sixth grades. !d. at 4SO n.lO. See generally GUAilALlii'E 
SAN MI(:LJI•:L. "LET ALL OF THEM TAKI•: H I•: Ell": MEXICAN AMEI<ICANS AND TilE 
C.\~11'.\IC:-.J FOH EDUCATIONAL EqUALITY IN TI•:XAS. 1910-19Sl (19S8). 
8:i. Hernandez. ;).17 U.S. at 479-80. 
84. !d. 
8;1. 8cc id. 
Hfi. !d. at 480. 
H7. For an excellent discussion of contemporary legal scholars perpetuating 
this idl'a, "''"' .Juan F. l'c•rPa. The Blach!White Binary l'orodigm of Race, in 
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its roots in the events that led up to the Civil War. Before 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Dred Scott u. Sanford that African Americans 
were property, and therefore not citizens of the United 
States. 88 At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted and explicitly overruled the Dred 
Scott decision, giving African Americans state and federal 
citizenship. 89 Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the civil equality of 
newly freed slaves from hostile state action. 90 However, 
these Fourteenth Amendment protections were later eroded 
when Plessy u. Ferguson (overruled by Brown v. Board of 
Education, 34 7 U.S. 483) sanctioned the "separate but 
equal" regime established by Jim Crow laws throughout the 
South.91 All of this legal action specifically focused on the 
black-white divide. 
This established black-white mindset posed special 
challenges for LULAC lawyers. At the time of Hernandez, 
Mexican American activists struggled with desegregation 
on the basis that the law classified Mexican Americans as 
white. This classification was problematic not only because 
there was no legal precedent that recognized discrimination 
outside of the black-white context but also because it 
presented challenges to Mexican Americans in 
distinguishing themselves without being reclassified by 
race. Notably, LULAC activists did not advance the 
argument that Fourteenth Amendment protections should 
be given to Mexican Americans by reclassifying Mexican 
Americans as non-white. Instead, LULAC activists sought 
to have Mexican Americans recognized as a segment of the 
white population that suffered from discrimination. 92 
Historian Mario T. Garcia notes that "LULAC rejected any 
Ci<I'l'IC'.L I{M'E THEORY: TilE CUTTINC EDC:I·:. passim (Richard Delgado & Jean 
S!Pfancic cds., 2000). 
88. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 39:1, :l9fi (18fi6). 
89. U S. CO"JST. amend. XIV§ 1. 
90. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 8:1 U.S. 36, 81 (187:1); Straudcr v. W('st 
Virginia, 100 U.S. :l03, 306 ( 1879). 
91. PIPssy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. fi37 (1896). oucrmlcd hy Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 48:l (1954). 
92. MARIO T. GARCIA, MEXICAN AMERICANS 48 (1989). 
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attempt to segregate Mexican Americans as a nonwhite 
population."9 :l Garcia further clarifies that LULAC 
attorneys consistently argued that Mexicans should legally 
be recognized as members of the white race who deserved 
special protections because of the historical discrimination 
they suffered in their communities. 94 
In contrast to this historical system of basing 
Fourteenth Amendment protections on legally based 
distinctions of race alone, the Hernandez decision 
implemented a community-based standard in 
distinguishing a social class. Rather than relying upon 
differences of skin color, the court considered 
discriminatory treatment within the community that was 
directed toward the group in question. Ian F. Haney Lopez 
argues that Hernandez was a milestone for Latinos in 
particular. 95 According to Haney Lopez, "No Supreme Court 
case has dealt so squarely with this question [of Latino 
racial identity], before or since."96 He argues that the 
Hernandez opmwn requires that the identification of 
whether or not a racial group exists is a local question that 
can "be answered only in terms of community attitudes."97 
"To translate this insight into [a] broader language, race is 
social, not biological."98 He further argues, "Races exist only 
as local facts measured in terms of community attitudes 
and the material inequalities such attitudes have built 
up." 99 Whether or not Mexican Americans constituted a 
targeted minority group depended not solely on their 
ancestry or the pigmentation in their skin, but on local 
~J:l. !d. 
~l.f. !d. See also ROilOLFO F. ACUNA, A:-.JYTHING BUT MEXfCA:-.J: CH!Ci\:-.JOS f:-.1 
CO:\'l'E~II'OHAHY Los AN<:ELES (199G) (documenting the efforts by Mexican 
~\mericans to embrace Spanish as opposr•d to Mexican identity in gneater Los 
Angeles during parts of thr> twentieth century to avoid discrimination). 
9f'>. Haney Lopez, supra note :l, at J 146. 
~Hi. !d. (arguing that 1/ernandez is a crucial case that hr!lped to form the 
newly established LatCrit movement, which is a movement that is dedicated to 
exploring Latino/a issuPs and the law). 
97. !d. at 116:1. 
9K. Ian F. Haney Lopez, Retaining Race: LatCrit Theory and Mexican 
Amerimn Identity in Hernandez v. Texas, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 279, 288 
(1997). 
~n !d. at 289. 
~i68 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
community attitudes. However, while shifting the focus of 
Fourteenth Amendment class protection from the previous 
black-white standard to a community-based standard 
allowed the Hernandez legal team to establish 
discrimination for a previously unprotected class, there 
were some potentially negative consequences for Mexican 
Americans. 100 
VII. HERNANDEZ: 
PROVIDlNC PRECEDENT TO END JURY DISCRIMINATION 
Hernandez v. Texas established precedent that extended 
Fourteenth Amendment protections to all identifiable 
minority groups against the exclusion from jury venires. 
Specifically, the Hernandez ruling helped integrate 
minorities into juries by setting a legal precedent that an 
"identifiable group" created by societal norms and not solely 
by race-based classifications should be protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 101 In carving out this precedent, 
100. Today, tlw two group~ that historically defined race relations in the United 
States, whitl•s and hlaeks, no longer account for the ovPrwhl•lming majority of 
Americans. Sec Rachl·l F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White. 2 Hi\1/V. LNI'INO L. REV. 61, 
61-62 (Fall 1!197): sec also THOMAS KUHN, THE STIWCTlJilE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIO:-.JS (2d ed. 1 !170); Juan F. Perea, Los Oluidados: On the Mu/,inp of llll•isible 
People, 70 N.Y. U. L. Rrw. 96ii (199fi). In the 1950s and 1960s, whl·n the modern civil 
rights movement was in its ascendancy. Whites accounted for almost 90°iJ of the 
population. and Blacks represented nearly 10%. Deborah Ramirez. 1\llulticultural 
Empowerment: It's Not Just nlach and White Anymore. 4 7 ST.·\)';. L. REV. 957. 9iil' 
(1995). Latinos and As inn Americans combined amountPd to on!:-· about ;)""of the 
total population. !d. at 9:"iH-fi9. While one should hesitate when reading such 
statistics becau~e MPxican Americans were considered whit!' and it could be that 
many Mexican Americans counted themselves as whitt' rather than Mexican on 
the census registries and other data sheets. Not surprisingly. race relations were 
largely defined in Black-White terms. By 1990, dramatic changes had taken 
place. Due to th(e rapid growth in Latino and Asian American populations, about 
25% of Americans identified themselves as people of color, and only half of these 
identified themselv<'s as blnck. ADI\AHAM HOI•'Jo'MA~. UNW,\NTIW MEXTC\:-.J 
AMERIC'A:-.J:-o IN Till•: CHEAT Jh:I'HE:-;SJON: REPATIUATION l'ln:SSlJHI·:S l!J29-19:l9. at 
1:1-14 (1974): Hispanics Nou• Larf{est U.S. Minority. CBS NJ·:ws. ,Jan. 21. 200:l, 
m·ai/able at h tt. p:/ /www .cbsnews .com/stories/200 :l/01 /21 Ina tiona!/ main 
;);J/:J69.shtml. 
101. Hcrnundcz ma:-' have also helped integrate wonwn into ju1·\· vPnires. For 
pxample. in Burbcr l'. l'ontc. 772 F.2d 982. 1002 (198fi), Uw court recognized that 
llcrnundez integratPd "wonwn and blacks" and "Mexican i\nwricans" into jury service. 
This makes sense in that, under the Hernandez analysi;.;, if socidal norm;.; prove to 
show discrimination to femall's tlwn it is probable that fl,mal<·~ can also constitute a 
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the Court in Hernandez established a test that would later 
be inf1uential in determining whether jury selection 
processes discriminated against Mexican Americans as a 
social class and other groups that could now receiVe 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court recognized in Hernandez that Jackson County 
failed to offer any evidence that contradicted the assertion 
that Mexican Americans were discriminated against-
helping to establish the existence of a social class in 
Texas. 1 02 This recognition of discrimination led the 
protectl'd class for Fourtepnth Amendment purposes. See also Donald H. Zeigler. Young 
Adults as u Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. Rev. 1045 (1978). 
102. See {{enerally Hl•rnandez v. Texas (Hernandez), :147 U.S. 475 (HJ54). 
Kt>vin 1{ .• Johnson argues that several factors leading up the Hernandez decision 
combined to classify Mexican Americans as second-class citizens. ,Johnson. supru 
noll' fiH. at 154~5G. ,Johnson mentions two important factors. Id. First. the 
Unit<·d StatPs undertook mass deportation efforts in the 19:10s. Id. (citing 
F'H,\\i('IS('O E. BALIJJ<:IWAMA & RAYMD.'•JI) RODIUGUEZ, DE('ADE OF BETIL\Y,\L: 
MEXI('AN Rl•;l'ATRIATION IN THE 1930's (1!-J}Jfi) (The process of repatriation was a 
conniving scheme that worked. The government decided to give each Mexican 
i\nwrican family $100 to rl'turn to Mexico. They also enticed them with free or 
half-pricl·d train rides to the border or beyond. Once the Mexicans were 
n~patriatt•d to :\Texico. thl~ book then documents the plight of starting again in 
l\ll'xico with nothing, many times being sick or out of money wlwn they 
arrivt·d.)). Second, .Johnson discusses "Operation Wetback." ld. In spite of thP 
re<:ent.ly resolved Mexican Hevolution, Mexico sent 250,000 troops to Europl' as 
they fought under the United States in WWII. Id. Many Mexican workers 
workt>d in the southwestern United States during the war under a contract labor 
anangt>nwnt known as the Bracero Program. Id. The Bracero Program was one 
of tl1l' man:-· ways that Mt•xico joined the Allies during World War IT. Mexico, 
ridcl!t-cl with economic hardship throughout the earlv twentieth centurv. was 
anxious to maintain friendly relations with the United States because thPy saw 
the United States as a potential source of income for even the most unskilled 
Mexican laborers. Id. Tlw United States was anxious to take advantage of the 
economic opportunity that importing unskilled laborprs presented. Id. In order 
to legal!:-· import these workers, the U.S. established a program to lure Mexican 
"Bracl·ro,.;." or work,ers designated to help them produce supplies for the war 
effort: when the soldiers returned and wanted their jobs back, the government 
establislwd a militant program to repatriate the Mexican Nationalists called 
"Opl'ration Wetback." !d.: see generally NICLSON CA<:I•; COJ>P, WETilACKS ANil 
BIL\('Jo:IWS: MEXH'AN MJ(:RANT LABORimS AND AMERICAN I'OLICY, nJ:lO I 9G0 
(I 9fi:l): C'.\lliWL NOIHl\IICST, RIO GRANilE WETBACKS: MEXICA01 MIGRANT Wolii\ERS 
(19/:2): l\1.\liK REISLEH. BY THE SWEXI' OF THEIR BROW: MEXICA\i J~i.\II(:IL\:\T 
L.\llOH 1:\ TilE U:\ITEil STATES. 1900-1940 (197G); l:H;;.:f{y P. A"'llEHSO:\. Till·: 
13H.-\('Jo:IW I'HCH:RAM IN CAL!FORNL\ (197fi); ,JUAN RA~ION GARCIA. 0J>EI\i\TI00i 
WETIL\('J-.:: TilE MASS DI·;J>ORTATION 01•' MEXICAN UNIJO('LJMENTED WOHI\1-:J\S IN 
1 9i'i-~ ( l 9SO): ERASMO CAM BOA, MEXICAN LABOI( AND WORLil WAH 11: BRAC J.;JiOS IN 
Till·: ]',\l'II•'I (' NOH'I'IIWI•;ST, 1942~ 194 7 ( EHJO). 
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Supreme Court to decide to extend Fourteenth Amendment 
protections to persons of any distinct social class. The Court 
held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not directed 
solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'-
that 1s, based upon differences between 'white' and 
Negro." 10:3 As the petitioner, Hernandez had 
"substantiat[ed] his charge of group discrimination . [by] 
prov[ing] that persons of Mexican descent constitute a 
separate class in Jackson County, distinct from 'whites."' 104 
The Court decided that despite the lack of a legally 
recognized racial distinction between the groups, the action 
of jury exclusion violated Fourteenth Amendment 
protections. 105 By recognizing Mexican Americans as a 
separate class, the Court substantiated Hernandez's claim 
that he had suffered discrimination. Specifically, the Court 
noted that "it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance 
resulted in their [sic] being no member of this class among 
the over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years." lOfi 
In short, Hernandez opened the door for Fourteenth 
Amendment protection into jury selection; a legal protection 
that had previously been recognized only for African 
Americans. 
After the reconstruction era, the Supreme Court 
recognized the right of African Americans to participate in 
Jury service. 107 In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court 
lO:l. Hernrmdez, :147 U.S. at 478. 
104. !d. at 479. The Court further concluded that "it must be concludPd that 
petitioner succeeded in his proof." Jd. at 480. 
105. Jd. at 482. 
106. Jd. 
107. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 30:l, :107-08 (1879) (striking down a 
state statute limiting jury service to white males becaus(' it violates Pqual 
protPction rights of African Americans). Strauder began a long string of other 
jury discrimination cases decided by the United States Supreme Court that 
would pave the way for Hernandez v. Texas. Sec Neal v. Delaware, 10:1 U.S. :no 
(1880): Carter v. Texas. 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); Norris v. Alabama. 294 U.S. 
fl87 (19:lfJ); Hale v. Kentucky, 30:1 U.S. 613 (19:J8); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 
:lfl4 (Hl:19); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, :llfi U.S. 400 
( 1942): Akins v. Texas, 32fl U.S. 398 (1945); Patton v. Mississippi, :J:l2 U.S .. f6;) 
(1947); Cassell v. Texas, 3:l9 U.S. 282 (19fl0); and Avery v. Georgia, :l45 U.S. flfl9 
(1953). It is interesting to note how many of the United Stall's Supreme Court 
cases that come from the state of Texas. Carter, Smith, Hill, Akins, Cassell. and 
llernandez each found the state of Texas to be discriminating in the jury 
select ion process because of race or color. 
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struck down a state statute qualifying only white people for 
jury duty because it determined that legislation exempting 
African Americans from jury duty implied inferiority in 
civil society. 108 In Carter v. Texas, the Court expanded its 
reasoning used in Strauder to hold that "[w]henever by any 
action of a state ... all persons of the African race are 
excluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving 
as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of 
the African race, the equal protection of the laws is 
denied .... "109 This same effort to eliminate discrimination 
in jury selection continued, and in 1935, in Norris v. 
Alabama, the Court rejected the testimony that a 
community simply gathered those that were the best 
qualified for jury selection resulting in the complete 
exclusion of African Americans. 110 The reasoning in Norris 
proved significant for the Court in its future efforts at 
eliminating discrimination in jury selection in Hernandez. 
The Hernandez decision used Norris to reject the 
testimony of the Jackson County jury commissioners. 111 
These comm1sswners stated that their reason for 
eliminating Mexican Americans from jury rolls was simply 
a result of selecting citizens who were the most qualified for 
jury service .112 Chief Justice Warren wrote in his opinion 
that mere testimony of an alternative basis of selection is 
insufficient and cited the following language from Norris: 
That showing as to the long-continued exclusion of 
[N]egroes from jury service, and as to the many [N]egroes 
qualified for that service, could not be met by mere 
generalities. If, in the presence of such testimony as 
defendant adduced, the mere general assertions by officials 
of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an 
adequate justification for the complete exclusion of 
[N]egroes from jury service, the constitutional provision .. 
would be but a vain and illusory requirement. 113 
lOll. 8trauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08. 
109. Carter. 177 U.S. at 447. 
110. Norris, 294 U.S. at 598. 
Ill. Hernandez, :547 U.S. at 481. 
112. Jd. 
1 U. Jd. at 481-82 (citing Norris, 294 U.S. at 598). 
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Thus, Norris provided an important precedent in 
rejecting the biases of community members about the 
fitness of a particular group as valid criteria for 
withholding constitutional rights such as jury selection. 
The Hernandez ruling built on the Norris precedent rrnd 
extended equal protection to jury venire exclusion from 
African Americans to other "identifiable groups." 114 After 
the Court accepted the proof that Mexican Americans were 
treated disparately and as inferiors, it determined that, if 
the "attitude of the community" is such that it creates a 
hostile environment to an "identifiable group" within the 
community, such groups should receive Fourteenth 
Amendment protections.1 15 
In order to extend this protection to Hernandez, the 
LULAC team had to prove to the Warren Court that the 
method used by jury commissioners excluded Mexican 
Americans from jury venire selections. To do this, the 
county's method of using surname data collected by thosl~ 
who sat for juries 116 wrrs scrutinized. The Court noted that 
because jury commissioners work from a list of names, that 
"just as persons of a different race are distinguished by 
color, these Spanish surnames provide ready identification 
of the members of this class." 1 17 The exclusion of all 
individuals having Spanish-sounding surnames provided 
ready evidence for the Court that the method of jury 
selection as used by the county was discriminatory. 
114. This argument IS daborated in much more detail in Sandra Gu('rra 
Thompson. The Non -Discrimination ideal of HPrnandez v. Texas ( 'on/ronls a 
"Culture" of IJiscriminution: T/w Amazing Story of l'vliller-El v. T<·xas. ~.) 
CHI<'ANO-LATINO L. REV. 97. 101 (2005). 
115. Hernandez, :l47 U.S. at 4 7H-79. 
116. !d. at 480-81. Whik surname tables prov"d t>fTective, it. is lik<•ly that 
man:-- Latinos had changc>d their surname in Texas for assimilation purpost•s. Jt. 
is also likely that intermarriage. adoption. and other circumstanct>s madP thi.s 
pract.ic<' slightly problematic. It proved. however, to he a good indicator. Sandra 
Guerra Thompson notes that "[b]y rl'lying on 'Latin Anwrican surnames· the 
Court was presumabl:-· willing to include persons who lineage might he· traceablto 
to othpr Latin American countries such as Peru or (;uatemala. although tlw 
defendant's claim was that persons of Mexican descent were the 'distinct' class. 
Giv('n the testimony provided at the hearing, it is likely that the community 
wotdd have treated all persons of Latin American dl'scent as 'J\1pxican."' 
Thompson. supra notP 114. at 106 n.47. 
111. Hernandez, ;)47 U.S. at 481 n.12. 
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If there was any ambiguity as to whether or not the 
Court intended the Hernandez decision to expand the 
Fourteenth Amendment to other social groups subject to 
discrimination, it did not last long. The Court further 
clarified its intention to recognize discrimination in jury 
selection one year later in Swain u. Alabama. 11 H In Swain, 
although the particular method for jury selection was not 
discriminatory, the Court specifically recognized that not 
only is the exclusion of African Americans unconstitutional, 
but the Court interpreted the Hernandez decision to apply 
to "any identifiable group in the community which may be 
the subject of prejudice." 119 This standard of jurisprudence 
that eliminated jury discrimination based upon the 
Hernandez decision did not end with Swain. 
Castaneda u. Partida 120 expanded the Hernandez ruling 
by using it as a jury discrimination test. Unlike Hernandez, 
in Castaneda there was not complete exclusion. but simply 
disproportionate representation on the grand jury. 1:2 1 In 
Castaneda, although 79.1 ex, of the broader population was 
comprised of Mexican Americans, only 89%, of persons 
summoned for grand jury service over an eleven-year period 
were Mexican American. 122 The Court found this staggering 
disparity sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination against Mexican Americans. 128 
The Court further reasoned that because the state could not 
provide evidence to rebut the accusations, it became 
"impossible to draw any inference" about how many 
Mexican Americans qualified for jury service. 124 The Court 
rejected the possibility that because Mexican Americans 
held more elected offices in the area they were actually the 
governing majority who simply excluded themselves from 
jury venires. 12 :5 Therefore, even without the complete 
exclusion of Mexican Americans from juries, Castaneda had 
llK. Swain v. J\lahama, :lKO U.S. 20:2 (19GF>). 
ll~J. fd. at 20G (citing Hernandez, :l47 U.S. at 47F>). 
120. Castant>da v. Partida, 4:30 U.S. 4K2 (1977). 
1:21. Thompson, supra note 114, at lOS. 
1:22. Castenuda, 4:30 U.S. at 495. 
12:\. /d. at 496. 
121 /r/.at49K-99. 
12,). fd. at ,-,oo. 
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proven his claim of unconstitutional discrimination m Jury 
venire selection. 126 
The Castaneda decision used the Hernandez precedent 
to reinforce and expand several points. Justice Blackmun 
used Hernandez to reinforce the argument that the Court 
had "long recognized that 'it is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws' to try a defendant of a particular 
race or color"' in front of a jury '"from which all persons of 
his race or color have . . . been excluded by the 
State .... "' 127 In Castaneda, the Court used the test 
established in Hernandez to show a violation of equal 
protection. 128 It first looked at whether the group was "a 
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different 
treatment under the laws." 129 Then the Court continued the 
Hernandez test and considered whether the selection of 
jurors was proportional over a significant period of years 
and whether the selection procedure was susceptible to 
being abused. 130 Finally, the Court noted that, consistent 
with the Hernandez ruling, Mexican Americans constituted 
an identifiable class, and the exclusion of such a class 
constituted a prima facie case of discrimination. 131 This 
126. Td. at 499; Thompson, supra note 114. Thompson notes that the 
Supreme Court further reasoned "Because of thP many fact~ts of human 
motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of Jaw that human beings 
of one definable group will not discriminate against other memhL·rs of their 
group." ld. at 110 (citing Castenada. 4:l0 U.S. at 499). 
127. Castenada. 430 U.S. at 492 (quoting Hemandez v. '1\~xas (Hernandez). 
:147 U.S. 4 75. 477 (1954)). 
128. Td. at 494. 
129. ld. 
1:10. !d. 
1:n. ld. at 495. ,Justice Thurgood Marshall used Hernandez when ht; noted in hie; 
concurrPnce that since the jurors were selected on a discretionary basis and Spanish-
surnamed peopl<e are easily identified the "commissioners who constructed the grand 
jury pam·ls had ample opportunity to discriminate against Mexican-Americans." Jd. at 
fi01~02. It is also interesting to note that Justice Stewart, in a lone dis,;ent. argued 
that in Hernandez, since the Texas jury selection is '"capable of bl~ing utilized without 
discrimination'[.]" the Court should not interfpre with the Texas jury selection system. 
ld. at 51:1 n.4. While Hernandez only started anti-discriminatory practices with respect 
to jury venires, there are still many obstacles to be overcome before Mexican Americans 
will truly have full protections. Many jury systems employ various legal tools that 
effectively limit Mexican Am<erican jurors from serving: citizenship, English language 
requirements, peremptory challenges barring bilingual jurors, disqualiflcation of 
felons. and so on. See .Johnson. supra note 68, at 1 H6~9fi. 
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recognition as a class, as established in Hernandez, has 
proven significant in areas outside of jury selection for 
many Mexican Americans. 
VIII. HERNANDEZ: SHAPING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
Because of the Hernandez ruling, the law classified 
Mexican Americans as a protected class and eligible to 
receive Fourteenth Amendment protections. When the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown u. Board of 
Education later in the same month, this not only meant 
that Mexican Americans received protections from unfair 
jury discrimination, but also from other major forms of 
discrimination, such as segregation in schools. 132 School 
segregation was a widespread practice in communities with 
Mexican American populations. 133 Before Hernandez and its 
companion case Brown v. Board of Education, there was 
limited legal recourse for Mexican American students who 
suffered from school segregation. The courts were able to 
use Hernandez' reasoning to establish that Mexican 
American students, while legally classified as white, were 
experiencing discrimination and then were able to integrate 
Hernandez' reasoning with the reasoning in Brown v. Board 
of Education to eliminate historical practices of 
segregation. 1:14 
School districts throughout the Southwest had 
segregated Mexican Americans from Anglos for decades. 1:l5 
1:12. See BROWN AT 50: TilE UNFINISHED LECACY (Deborah L. Rhode & 
CharlPs Ogletree cds., 2004). 
!3.'J. Sec COLORED ME:-.1 ANIJ HOMBRES AQUf: HJWNANTJEZ V. TFXAS A'-ill THE 
EMEIH:ENC:E OF MEXICAN AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael Olivas mi., Arte l't!blico 
Press. 2006). 
134. Mark Tush net. Implementing, Transforming, and Abandoning Brown. in 
BR0\\''-1 \T 50: TilE U:-.JFINISH Ell LEGACY (Deborah L. Rhode & Charles Ogletree 
eds .. 2004). 
131). Sec GUADALUPE SAN MJUUEL, CONTF:STED POLICY (2004); GUADALUPE 
SA:-.J MI<:UEL, BIWWN, NOT WHITE (2001); GUADALUPE SAN MH:UEL, LET ALL OF 
THE~! TAKE HEED MEXJCA:-.J AMERICANS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIO:\,\L 
EQUALITY IN TEXAS (19tl7). Guadalupe San Miguel is one of the most widely cited 
authors with respect to Mexican American desegregation in Texas, the bilingual 
education debate in Texas, and other issues facing Mexican American public 
education. Guadalupe San Miguel argues that Hernandez did not identify 
Mexican Americans as a cognizable ethnic group and that Mexican Americans 
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Legal justification for segregation had developed in many 
states prior to 1954, when the Court ruled segregation was 
unconstitutional. For example, in 1918, one school board in 
Santa Ana, California, decided to segregate Mexican 
Americans and Anglos at the urging of its all-Anglo PTA 
Board because '"it would be a rank injustice to our school, 
our teachers, and our children' if Mexican American 
children continued to attend" school with white children_l:lfi 
The city attorney provided the legal foundation for that 
decision. He informed the Board that while it was legal to 
segregate "'Indians, Chinese, and people of Mongolian 
descent,"' the law provided "no provision to maintain 
separate schools for" Mexican Americans. 1:l7 However, since 
it was legal to segregate Mexican Americans on the grounds 
of language, age, and regularity of attendance, segregation 
was "'fully supported by the law."'l:Js Segregation practices 
against Mexican Americans were perhaps so widespread not 
only because they sometimes found legal justifications, but 
also because court decisions ending segregation were met 
with opposition. 
Even before Hernandez, there were lawsuits filed 
throughout the Southwest to end segregation of Mexican 
American and Anglo studentsY19 In 194 7, in Westminster 
School District of Orange County v. Mendez, llll Gonzalo 
Mendez and many other plaintiffs challenged Santa Ana's 
legal basis for segregating Mexican Americans. They argued 
that segregation of Mexican American children violated the 
were not classified as a cognizable ethnic group until Cisneros. Ht> also argups 
that the Hernandez n!ling only applied to ,Jackson County, 'J\,xas. By contrast, 
this papt>r argues that Hernandez c!assifiecl Mexican Americans as an 
identifiable, "discreet and insular" minority group whert>ver social norms show 
that thc~y are a distinct group. 
136. GJLBEI(T GONi:i\LEi:, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF SEc:J{EC:i\TION 
141 (1990) (quoting Santa Ana School District Board of Education, minutes, 19 
August 1918). 
137. Id. 
1:38. Id. 
139. S,\N MIGUEL. BROWN, NOT WlllTE, supra note 1:3G, at 47. LULAC 
activists were also able to successfully end the segregation of Mexican 
Americans and whites in swimming pools, restaurants, hospitals. and other 
forms of public accommodations. See MARIO T. GAI(ClA, MEXICAN AMERICANS: 
LI·:\JJEJ{SHJJ'. IIliWLO<;Y & IDJ·::-.JTI'I'Y: 1930-1960. at 48 (1989). 
140. Wl•stminstPr Sch. Dist. v. Ml~ndt>z, 1()1 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). 
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Fourteenth Amendment because no California State law 
existed to give them authority to segregate nonwhite 
races. 141 While segregated, Mexican Americans complained 
that "'they and all others of Mexican and Latin descent 
were being barred [from] . . . receiving the benefits and 
education furnished to other children."' 142 California State 
Education codes allowed segregation of nonwhite races only, 
and because the law considered Mexicans white, the 
segregation of Mexican American children denied and 
deprived them of equal protection of the laws. 143 In Mendez, 
Stephens, the presiding judge, wrote for the majority and 
issued an injunction prohibiting segregation of Mexican 
American children. The court held that the school district 
could not segregate white students from other white 
students-and since the law considered Mexican Americans 
white. the district had illegally segregated the two 
groups. 14-l 
1Wendcz. a case decided pre-Brown u. Board of 
Education, quickly generated a lot of controversy among 
those legal scholars who considered Mexican Americans as 
racially distinct from whites because it seemed to be 
inconsistent with the Plessy u. Ferguson Supreme Court 
ruling. Columbia Law Review published an article arguing 
that the court in Mendez was inconsistent with Plessy 
because no constitutional issue existed regarding 
segregation "so long as equal facilities were made available 
to both groups." 145 The Yale Law Journal also asserted the 
decision was inconsistent with Plessy; however, it argued 
that "modern sociological and psychological studies lend 
much support to the District court's views." 146 Mendez set a 
141. (;I LllEI\T GO~ZALI·:S, CHIC'A:-.JO EDUCATION I~ THE ERA OF SEC;]{E< :ATI<J:\ 
l ::J:l ( 1 HHO). 
1~2. Marco Portales. "A History of Latino Segregation Lawsuits," in BL,\CK 
lSSUI•:S I~ HI<:HE]( EDUCATION: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF BIWWN V. BOAIW OF 
ElllH'NI"ION 12() (.James Anderson & Dary N. Byrne eds., 2004) (quoting Mendez, 
161 F.2d nt 776 (1947)). 
ll:L /d. at 128. 
1-41. Mendez. Hil F.2d at 780. 
l~il. Case Note. SegreEJation in Schools as a Violation of the X!Vth 
Amendment, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 325 (1947). 
14(i. Noll'. Segregation in Public Schools~A Violation of "Rqu.al Protection of 
the I>ou·s." :)()YALE L .• J. lO!'iH (1947). 
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legal precedent for ending segregation of Mexican 
Americans in schools. However, efforts at desegregation 
were rendered impotent when, rather than integrating 
Mexican Americans into white schools, many communities 
integrated Mexican Americans into schools that were 
predominately black. Despite these obstacles posed to 
desegregation efforts, the legal precedent established in 
Mendez still proved significant. 
The Mendez decision inspired anti-segregation lawsuits 
resulting in the Delgado u. Bastrop decision, a landmark 
case for Mexican American desegregation efforts. 147 In 
Delgado, the court affirmed the controversial Mendez 
decision and "undermined the rigid segregation of the pre-
1948 Texas school system." 148 The plaintiffs attorneys 
demonstrated that because of the segregated school system, 
"the median educational attainment for persons over 
twenty-five was 3.5 years for those with Spanish 
surnames . . . [compared to] 10.3 years for Anglo-
Americans."14~) Marco Portales argues in an article that the 
Delgado decision "served as a precursor to how the Supreme 
Court would rule in Brown." 150 However, while both 
Delgado and Mendez helped to provide legal precedent for 
ending segregation of Mexican Americans at the state level, 
no case had yet risen to the level of the Supreme Court and 
established national precedent. 
Hernandez was the first case to take the issue of racial 
bias against Mexican Americans to the national level. 
Mexican Americans were able to use the precedent set in 
Hernandez to implement the Fourteenth Amendment 
147. Delgado v. Bastrop lndep. Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 81-lil (W.D. Tex. 1941-l). It 
is discussed in GUADALUPE SAN MH:UEL, .JK.. "LET 1\.LL OF THEM TAKE HEEll": M!-:XlCA:--: 
A~IEHIC',\:--.!S A:--.!IJ THE CAMPAIC:N FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY IN TEXAS, 1\Jl0-191-ll, at 
123-26, 171-l (19H7). 8eP also SAN MICilTEL, BROWN, NOT WHI'I'I<:, supra note 1:35: 
GO:-JZALEZ, supra note 141. This case was a landmark case becausP at this time. 
legal remedies were virtually nonexistent for Mexican Americans-not because it 
was a case that set nationally binding precedent. 
14H. SA:--.! MIGUEL. BROW:--.!, NOT WHITE. supra note J:Hi. 
149. V. Carl Allsup, Delgado u. Bastrup !S!J, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, 
http://www. tsha. utexas.ed u/handbook/online/articles/DD/jrd 1. h tml (last visited 
March 26, 2006): sec also MARIO T. GARCIA, DESERT IMMIGRANTS: Tfn: MEXIC\:-JS 
OF EL PASO, lHS0-1920 (1981). 
150. POHTALES. supra note 142. at 121-l. 
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protections afforded to minority groups other than blacks in 
order to desegregate using the principles established by 
Brown v. Board of Education. In Cisneros v. Corpus Christi 
Independent School District, 151 parents brought a class 
action against the Corpus Christi Independent School 
District and its Board of Trustees alleging that the schools 
were segregated in Corpus Christi. 152 The plaintiffs could 
show evidence of segregation in Corpus Christi as early as 
1896. 153 The court established that Mexican Americans 
were an identifiable ethnic group in Corpus Christi by 
using the reasoning in Hernandez. 154 The court extended 
the Brown ruling in Cisneros because, prior to Cisneros, 
Brown only protected minonhes from state-mandated 
segregation. 155 In Corpus Christi, there were no statutes 
that mandated segregation by the state, however, the court 
held in Cisneros that it makes no difference whether it is by 
statute or social norms-segregation is illegal in public 
schools. 156 This same recognition of social norms was 
significant in Hernandez in establishing discrimination. 
However, because it rose to the level of the Supreme Court, 
the Hernandez decision not only expanded Fourteenth 
Amendment protections to Mexican Americans as a class 
that had been discriminated against, but also expanded 
these protections to them as a class previously considered 
white, opening the door for desegregation efforts when 
other attempts had failed. 
In the controversial case of Keyes v. School District No.1, 
Denver, Colorado, the Supreme Court used Hernandez to 
reason, "Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." l57 Relying upon 
151. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent Seh. Dist., 4()7 F.2d 142 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
152. /d. at 144. 
15:i. SAN Mi<:lJEL. BIWWN, NOT WHITE, supra note 1 :)5, at 22. 
154. Cisneros, 467 F.2d at 147, 152. 
155. ld. at l4H. 
156. ld. at 149. 
157. Ke:-•es v. Sch. !list. No. l. 413 U.S. 189, 197 (l~J7:l) (citing Hernandez v. 
Texas (Hernandez). :l47 U.S. 475 (1954)). The plaintiffs asked the court to rule on 
the following questions: (1) Can Brown apply to Mexican Americans? (2) If it 
can, does it apply to the particular case in Corpus Christi? (:l) Is there a dual or 
unitary school system for blacks and whites? (4) If there is segregation, is it de 
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this reasoning, the Court concluded that the district court 
erred when it failed to place "Negroes" and "Hispanos" in 
the same category as a protected class. 158 The Court held 
that in Denver, Mexican Americans constitute a protected 
class and should be integrated with the Anglo students so 
that they can be afforded the same opportunities. 1 " 9 
In addition to the Supreme Court holding in Keyes, the 
Court also found in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke 160 that Strauder, Yick Wo, Korematsu, and 
Hernandez combined guaranteed equal protection to all 
persons regardless of any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality. In Bakke, the Court reaffirmed the 
abolishment, as articulated in Hernandez, of the "two-class" 
theory of race and declared that racial minorities are 
entitled to a special "degree of protection greater than that 
accorded others."161 The Court's use of Hernandez in these 
landmark cases regarding race illustrates the importance of 
the Hernandez decision in U.S. legal history. 1f> 2 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Hernandez became a landmark civil rights case because 
it established Mexican Americans and other minority 
groups previously unrecognized by the law as a class 
eligible for Fourteenth Amendment protections, which had 
previously been held as an African American dominated 
arena. The significance of the precedent established in 
Hernandez continues to increase today as the two groups 
that historically defined race relations in the United States. 
jure or de facto? (5) If there is segregation, how can the court dist>stablish tlw 
dual system and maintain a unitary one? SAN MIUUEL, BIWWN, NoT WIIITE. 
supra note 1:l5, at 77. 
15H. Keyc8, 41.'3 U.S. at 196-97. 
159. Id. at 198. 
Hill. Regl'nts of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 4:-\H U.S. 2n5. 292- 9:l (1 ~J7H). 
161. !d. at 295. 
ln2. Sec RUBE:-.1 DONATO, THE 0THI.;R ST!WGCLE FOil E<)U,\L S("IIOOLc;: 
MEXJC,\N AMimiCANS DURIN(; THI" CIVIL RIGHTS ER,\ (19()7); WII,LIN HAWLEY, 
EFFEl'TIVE Sl'HOOL DESEl;REGATION: EqUITY, quALITY. A.'W FE,\SIBILITY 12:l 
(1981): CHH'A:\0 FAILURE AND SUCCESS: PAST, PHESE:-.JT, A:-.JIJ FUTUill·: (Richard R. 
Valencia eel., 2002); CA!{LOS KEVIN BLANTON, TilE STRANGE CA!\EI•:]{ OF 
B!Ll:-.JU LTAL EllLTCATION IN TEXAS 18:36-1981, at 11 i'i-16 (2004). 
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whites and blacks, no longer account for the overwhelming 
majority of Americans. 163 In the 1950s and 1960s, when the 
modern civil rights movement was in its ascendancy and 
Hernandez was decided, whites accounted for almost ninety 
percent of the population, 164 and blacks represented nearly 
ten percent. 165 Scholars estimated that Latinos and Asian 
Americans amounted to only about five percent of the total 
population when combined. 166 Not surprisingly, scholars 
and courts largely defined race relations in black-white 
terms. Hernandez redefined these terms in a way that 
continues to become of greater significance as definitions of 
race continue to evolve and the boundaries of a protected 
class under the Fourteenth Amendment continue to call for 
re-evaluation. However, while the full impact of Hernandez 
is still undetermined, its impact today cannot be disputed. 
The opinion of Hernandez has evoked a multitude of 
responses from scholars who disagree as to whether this 
actually hurt or helped Mexican Americans. This comment 
has shown that Hernandez (1) rejected the established "two-
class" social theory by extending Fourteenth Amendment 
privileges to other groups besides African Americans; (2) 
established a precedent to eliminate exclusion of social 
classes from jury venires; and (3) aided in the desegregation 
of schools. 
Hernandez also established the foundation for Cisneros 
v. Corpus Christi to extend the Brown v. Board of 
Education protections to Mexican Americans. Thus, 
Hernandez gave Mexican Americans, who the law classified 
as white, a protection that had previously been extended 
163. Moran, supra note 1 00; see also KUHN, supra note I 00; Perea, supra 
note 100. 
164. One should hesitate when reading such statistics because Mexican Americans 
were considered wbitl' and it could be that many Mexican Americans counted 
themselves as white> rather than Mexican on the census registries and other data 
sheets. Howl,ver. Francisco Baldl,rrama and Raymond Rodrigue>z docunwnt that in the 
earlv twentieth centur:> onl:-• a few hundred thousand Mexican Americans lived in the 
United States. R\LIJEHI\.\~L\ & !{ODHH:n:z. supra note 102. 
165. Deborah Ramin•z. 1\lfu/ticu/tural Empou·ermcnt: It's Not .Just H/ach and 
White Anymore. 47 ST,\'J. L. ]{EV. 0!17. 958-59 (199i1). 
166. For a discussion of Mexican American growth in tlw United States. see 
generally HOFFIVL\N, supm noll' 100, and Hispanics Now !~urges/ U.S. !VIinority, 
supru note 100. 
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only to African Americans -integrated schools. Another 
benefit of Hernandez was to provide impetus in integrating 
Mexican Americans into jury venires-a right that African 
Americans had had since the 1880 Strauder decision. 
Using Hernandez, the Supreme Court sent a message to 
the public that Mexican Americans and other minority 
groups should receive Fourteenth Amendment protections. 
The opinion thrust Mexican Americans into the civil rights 
arena when the modern concept of civil rights was still in 
its infancy. Although some skeptics say that Hernandez 
hurt Mexican Americans by not going far enough, 
Hernandez should be viewed as a landmark case that 
allowed Mexican Americans to establish themselves as a 
legitimate and unified social class eligible for the necessary 
legal recognition extended to all, the protections available 
to them under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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